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found that the defendant had used due care to provide a safe place
for the plaintiff to work and was entirely free from negligence. Since
the evidence on this point was in conflict, a definite determination
cannot be made as to the basis for the jury's finding. However, the
possibility exists that the jury did base its decision on an erroneous
classification of the plaintiff's conduct.
Most cases which go to trial under the FELA involve questionable
conduct on the plaintiff's part. It is submitted that the trial judge
should instruct the jury on the issue of assumption of risk, and its
distinction from contributory negligence and non-negligence, to avoid
any misclassification of the plaintiff's conduct by the jury.
ROBERT T. MITCHELL, JR.
THE MANSFIELD RULE OF NONACCESS
The question of legitimacy comes up in many different types of
cases.1 Among these, none are so anomalous as those in which a married
woman or her hubsand is attempting to prove that a child born or
conceived during marriage was sired by a stranger to the marriage.
The recent West Virginia case of State ex rel. Worley v. Lavender2
involved a filiation or bastardy proceeding in which the defendant was
charged with having fathered the child of the prosecutrix. 3 Under
objection by the defendant, both the prosecutrix and her husband
testified that they had been separated for thirteen months prior to
the birth of the child, and that they had no sexual relations during
that time. Further testimony indicated that the prosecutrix had sex-
ual intercourse only with the defendant during the period in which
the child was conceived. Upon this evidence, the defendant was con-
victed of bastardy and appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed the con-
'Ejectment: Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777); Adop-
tion: In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 Wash. 2d 759, 189 P.2d 458 (1948); Petition by
bastard for papers of administration for the estate of his alleged father: In re
Kessler's Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956); Contributing dependency pro-
ceeding; Vasquez v. Esquibel, 141 Colo. 5, 346 P.2d 293 (1959); Divorce: Bariuan
v. Bariuan, 186 Kan. 605, 352 P.2d 29 (196o); Married woman's paternity proceeding:
Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. 1951).
2131 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1963).
'W. Va. Code ch. 48, art. 7, § I (1961). The court in State ex rel. Crouser v.
Mercer, 141 W. Va. 691, 92 S.E.2d 745, 754 (1956), held that: "The bastardy pro-
ceeding provided for by the statute, though criminal in form, is a civil, not a
criminal action."
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viction, holding that, in the absence of a statute, neither a married
woman who institutes a bastardy proceeding, nor her husband should
be permitted to testify to the fact of nonaccess. One judge dissented,
criticising the rule as an anachronism, in view of the trend toward
abolishing disqualifications of witnesses, and as a rule promoting the
suppression of truth.
It has often been stated that the presumption of legitimacy is one
of the strongest known to our law.4 At early common law this pre-
sumption was conclusive,5 except when the husband was proved to
be impotent or "beyond the seas."(! Both the husband and wife were
disqualified from testifying as to nonaccess in filiation proceedings
because of their interest in discharging the husband from his duty to
support the child.7 But, as early as 1734, it appeared that the law was
developing in the direction of removing the historic disqualification.
The King v. Reading held that the wife could testify as to nonaccess
when her testimony was corroborated. However, in 1777, Lord Mans-
field made his "onerous pronouncement" in the case of Goodright v.
Moss:9
"[T]hat the declaration of a father or mother, cannot be ad-
nitted to bastardize the issue born after marriage ... [is] ... a
rule founded in decency, morality, and policy that they shall not
be permitted to say after marriage, that they have had no con-
nection, and therefore that the off-spring is spurious; more es-
pecially the mother, who is the offending party."' 0
'1 Jones on Evidence, § ioi, at 176 (sth ed. 1958); Morrison v. Nicks, 211 Ark.
261, 2o S.W.2d 100 (947); Bariuan v. Bariuan, 186 Kan. 605, 352 P.2d 29 (196o);
Cameron v. Roland, 2o8 La. 663, 23 So. 2d 283 (1945); Smith v. Smith, 71 S.D. 3o5,
24 N.V.d 8 (1946).
rToday it is generally held to be rebuttable. In Kowalski v. Wojtkowski, 19
N.J. 247, 116 A.2d 617 (1955), the dissenting judge cites 38 jurisdictions so holding.
As to the type of proof necessary to rebut the presumption, see McCormick, Evidence
§ 3o9 at 646-47 (1954). See also In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 17o N.E. 471, 473 (193o),
where Cardozo, J. after reviewing the various formulas concluded: "What is meant
by these pronouncements, however differently phrased, is this, and nothing more,
that the presumption will not fail unless common sense and reason are outraged
by holding that it abides."
GIn re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 17o N.E. 471 (193o); 1 Blackstone Commentaries
t. *457-
7Vigmore, Evidence § 20o63, at 361 (3d ed. i94o).
'Cas. t. Hard. 79, 95 Eng. Rep. 49 (K.B. 1734).
'2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
10Ibid.; Upon what policy Mansfield established the rule is unclear. Courts have
tried to supply an answer, for example Tioga County v. South Creek Township, 75
Pa. 433, 437 (1874): "Many reasons have been given for this rule. Prominent among
them is the idea that the admission of such testimony would be unseemly and
scandalous, and this not so much from the fact, that it reveals immoral conduct
upon the part of the parents, as because of the effect it may have upon the child,
1964]
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Although this pronouncement was not based on authority, on the
strength of Mansfield's reputation it soon became the universally ac-
pected doctrine. The rule of The King v. Reading which was based on
disqualification because of interest applied solely to the wife, and only
in filiation proceedings; the Mansfield Rule, based on broad grounds
of policy, applied to both spouses, and in all cases involving legiti-
macy.11
The Mansfield Rule was accepted generally in a majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions.12 However, this rule, which is considered by many
courts to be "too deeply planted to be uprooted,"13 has been the focus
of criticism since Dean Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, launched
his attack on it.
1 4
who is in no fault, but who must nevertheless be the chief sufferer thereby. That
the parents should be permitted to bastardize the child is a proposition which
shocks our sense of right and decency."
2Wigmore, Evidence § 2o63, at 360 (3d ed. 1940).
'Franks v. State, 26 Ala. App. 430, 161 So. 549 (1935); Shatford v. Shatford,
214 Ark. 612, 217 S.W.2d 917 (1949); McNamara v. McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac.
552 (1919); Morris v. Morris, 40 Del. 480, 13 A.2d 603 (Super Ct. 1940); Evans v.
State, 165 Ind. 369, 74 N.E. 244, 75 N.E. 651 (19o5); Craven v. Selway, 216 Iowa 515,
246 N.W. 821 (1933); Martin v. Stillie, 129 Kan. 19, 281 Pac. 925 (1929); Dudley's
Adm'r v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 240 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1951); Hubert v. Cloutier, 135
Me. 230, 194 At. 303 (1937); Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 8o N.E.2d 21 (1848); In
re Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375, 211 N.W. 746 (1927); Zutavern v. Zutavern, 155
Neb. 395, 52 N.W.2d 254 (1952); State v. Sargent, ioo N.H. 29, iiS A.2d 596 (1955);
Salas v. Olmos, 47 N.M. 408, 143 P.2d 871 (1943); In re Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d 781,
177 NY.S.2d 784 (1958); State v. Campo, 233 N.C. 79, 62 S.E.2d 5oo (195o); In re
Rowe's Estate, 172 Ore. 293, 141 P.2d 832 (1943); Commonwealth v. Carrasquilla, 191
Pa. Super. 14, 155 A.2d 473 (1959); Peoples Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. Manos Broth-
ers, 266 S.C. 257, 84 S.E.2d 857 (1954); Longoria v. Longoria, 324 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959); State v. Kellner, 247 Wis. 425, 2o N.WV.2d lO6 (1945).
'Wigmore, Evidence § 2o63, at 367 (3d ed. 1940); Harward v. Harward, 173
Md. 339, 196 Aftl. 318, 325 (Ct. App. 1938).
uWigmore, Evidence § 20o64, at 368-71, contains the following analysis and
criticism of the rule: "(i) There is an indecency, we are told. And yet, in nine
cases out of ten, the sole question that the wife is asked is (for example) whether
her husband was in St. Louis from 1929 to 1933 during the time that she was in
New York. Is this indecent? Moreover, the very next question may be whether
during that time she lived with alleged adulterer; and this (by general concession)
is indubitably allowable. In every sort of action whatever, a wife may testify to
adultery or a single woman to illicit intercourse; yet the one fact singled out as
'indecent' is the fact of non-access on the part of a husband. Such an inconsistency
is obviously untenable.
"(2) There is an immorality and a scandal, we are told, in allowing married
parents to bastardize their children. And yet they may lawfully commit this same
immorality by any sort of testimony whatever, except to the fact of non-access.
They may testify that there was no marriage-ceremony, or that the child was
born before marriage, or that the one party was already married to a third person,
or their hearsay declarations (after death) to illigitimacy in general may be used.
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Kansas was the first to reject the Mansfield Rule.1 In 1926, the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that, in the interest of truth and the
child's welfare, the mother was competent to testify as to nonaccess,
because her's was the best evidence.16 At the same time, in another
case, the court decided that where there was other evidence of non-
access the wife should be allowed to testify.17 However, within three
years, the court reversed itself in the case of Martin v. Stillie,18 and
readopted the Mansfield Rule. In a recent case'9 the Kansas court, in
dictum, suggested that perhaps the mother might be able to testify, but
that the father could not. No definitive statement, then, can be made
as to what position the Kansas court would take if directly presented
with the issue.
New Jersey in Loudon v. Loudon2 0 was the first American juris-
diction to take a firm position in direct opposition to the rule. Rely-
ing heavily on Wigmore, the court said:
"[T]he fact that the rule is based on a foundation that is un-
sound and leads to the suppression of the truth and the de-
feat of justice takes from it the customary traditional and prece-
dental justification urging its adoption. ' '21
But, the weight of this decision as a judicial precedent was weakened
In all these other ways they may lawfully do the mean act of helping to bastardize
their own children. Where is the consistency here? Of what value is this conjuring
phrase about 'bastardizing the issue,' if it will not do the trick more than once in a
dozen times? Moreover, what shall be said of a system of law which, while thus
rebuking parents who come to prove their children bastards, at the same time
by its own inhuman prohibition (unique among civilized peoples) had refused
absolutely to allow those parents, by any means whatever, to remove afterwards
(by legitimation) the consequences of their original error and to give to their in-
nocent children the sanction of lawful birth,-a refusal which is still maintained
in some of our jurisdictions? That the same law which harshly fixes the stain of
bastardy as perpetually indelible should censure parents for the abomination of
testifying to the bastardy is preposterous.
"The truth is that these highsounding 'decencies' and 'moralities' are mere
Pharisaical afterthoughts, invented to explain a rule otherwise incomprehensible,
and lacking support in the established facts and policies of our law. There never was
any true precedent for the rule; and there is just as little reason of policy to main-
tain it."
25Stillie v. Stillie, 121 Kan. 591, 249 Pac. 672 (1926); Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121
Kan. 6o, 249 Pac. 682 (1926).
IcStillie v. Stillie, 121 Kan. 591, 249 Pac. 672 (1926).
'7Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121 Kan. 6oi, 249 Pac. 682 (1926).
"129 Kan. 19, 281 Pac. 925 (1929).
"Bariuan v. Bariuan, 186 Kan. 6o5, 352 P.2d 29 (196o). See also ii Kan. L. Rev.
269 (1962).
20114 N.J. Eq. 242, 168 Atl. 84o (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
"Id. at 841.
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by the fact that New Jersey had a statute making spouses competent
witnesses in all court actions. 22
Mississippi was the first state to reject Goodright v. Moss outright,
doing so in Moore v. Smith,23 by holding that, in a filiation proceed-
ing, testimony of nonaccess is admissible to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy. Pointing out that the presumption is based on policy and
is essentially truth defeating, the court concluded that in modern cir-
cumstances the policy for ascertaining the truth is stronger than those
policies enunciated by Mansfield.
In a bastardy proceeding Ohio refused to follow Mansfield, 24 say-
ing that:
"[T]o impose upon the plaintiff the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt the impossibility of access at the time of
the conception of the child and then to disqualify both her and
her former husband as witnesses to that fact, is to set up an
insuperable barrier to the establishment of the truth. '2"
Many jurisdictions have passed statutes which make husbands and
wives competent to testify where they were not so at common law.
These, and statutes giving a married woman the right to accuse a man
other than her husband of being the father of her child, have, in many
instances, been held to abrogate the Mansfield Rule. However, some
courts construe these strictly and continue to uphold the Mansfield
doctrine.
In Kennedy v. State,26 under a statute that made a mother compe-
tent "in all cases of bastardy," Arkansas held that she could testify
as to any fact tending to prove illegitimacy except as to the nonaccess
of her husband. The court would require an express provision making
the wife competent to testify as to that evidence. And in People ex
rel. Cullison v. Dile,27 where an Illinois statute expressly made the
wife competent to testify in bastardy proceedings, it was held that the
wife could testify, but, in the absence of an express provision, the
husband could not. In Hubert v. Cloutier,28 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine, recognizing Wigmore's criticism, but feeling that
the Mansfield Rule embodied the better policy, said:
-1The effect of statutes on the rule will be dealt with infra.
2 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937).
-AYerian v. Brinker, 35 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
'Id. at 881.28n17 Ark. 113, 173 S.W. 842 (1915).
'347 Ill. 23, 179 N.E. 93 (1931).
2135 Me. 230, 194 Ati. 303 (1937).
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"Statutes removing the bar against parties testifying or even
those specifically authorizing the mother to testify in bastardy
proceedings do not change the Mansfield rule. The effect of
such enactments is merely to make a witness competent, not to
let down the bars as to the evidence which may be properly
admitted."
29
The trend, however, seems to be developing in the direction of
holding that such statutes do remove the disqualification. So, under a
statute making the spouses competent in all actions, testimony as to
nonaccess has been held to be admissible.30 And, a statute making all
persons of sufficient understanding, including the parties, competent
to testify has been held to abrogate the common law rule.3 1 A statute
making libellant and libellee competent in divorce actions qualifies
the husband to testify.32 And, where "illegitimacy can be proved like
any other fact," the Mansfield Rule does not apply.33 In a divorce
action on the ground of adultry, the wife's admissions to a probation
officer were allowed, there being a statute which made the spouses
competent in non-support and illegitimacy proceedings, but which
did not cover divorce actions. Although the court said that it was not
deciding whether the wife's testimony as a witness would be admis-
sible, it implied that it would be.34 In England the Mansfield Rule
was abolished by statute in 1949.35
Two recent District of Columbia cases construing the same type of
statute as is involved in the principal case, which gives a cause of ac-
tion to a woman who is not living or cohabiting with her husband
at the time of conception, held that the wife is competent to testify.3
In Peters v. District of Columbia the court said that giving the wife
a remedy implied the right to testify as to nonaccess 3 7
It is submitted that the majority of the court in the principal case
reached the wrong result. The statute gave the mother a right, but
the court, in effect, denied her a remedy by refusing to allow her to
-194 At. at 304.
'In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552 (1919); Vasquez v. Esquibel,
141 Colo. 5, 346 P.2d 293 (1959).
'State v. Soyka, 181 Minn. 533, 233 N.W. 3oo (1930); In re Adoption of a Minor,
29 Wash. 759, 189 P.-d 458 (1948).
"Adams v. Adams, 102 Vt. 318, 148 Ad. 287 (1930).
'In re Wray's Estate, 33 Mont. 525, 19 P.-2d 1051 (1933), In re Findlay, 253 N.Y.
1, 17o N.E. 471 (1930); State v. Coliton, 17 N.W.2d 546 (N.D. 1945); In re Kessler's
Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N-W.2d 599 (956).
31Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 8o N.E.2d 21 (1948).
3McCormick, Evidence 146 n.5 (1954).
3Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. 1951); Murphy v. District of
Columbia, 85 A.2d 8o5 (D.C. 1952).
m84 A.2d 119 (D.C. 1951).
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